Exploring Efficiency in Private Value Bargaining
TexGen, a research centre known for its focus on decision research and experimental economics, delves into the realm of private value bargaining with naive players. In their recent publication titled '(In)efficiency in private value bargaining with naive players: Theory and experiment', the researchers, A. Possajennikov and R. Saran, unveil a fascinating exploration. The study investigates a two-player double-auction bargaining scenario where traders hold discrete two-point overlapping distributions of valuations. The researchers meticulously characterize parameter settings, identifying conditions conducive to fully efficient equilibria. This in-depth analysis not only sheds light on the nuances of private value bargaining but also offers insights into strategic decision-making in economic interactions.
Revealing the Power of Social Relationships in Team Production
One of TexGen's standout contributions comes in the form of 'Measuring “Group Cohesion” to Reveal the Power of Social Relationships in Team Production.' This article by S. Gächter, C. Starmer, and F. Tufano, published in the Review of Economics and Statistics, introduces the concept of 'group cohesion' as a lens through which to study social relationships within team production dynamics. By adapting psychological scales and conducting a series of experiments, the researchers offer a novel approach to analyzing the economic impact of social connections. Through their innovative measurement methodology and experimental investigations, TexGen's work elucidates the role of group dynamics in shaping collective outcomes, providing valuable insights for both academia and industry.
Unpacking Bargaining Dynamics with Experimental Evidence
TexGen's research extends to investigating bargaining behaviors with empirical evidence, as demonstrated in the journal article 'The Attraction and Compromise Effects in Bargaining: Experimental Evidence' by F. Galeotti, M. Montero, and A. Poulsen. This study delves into unstructured bargaining scenarios with known payoffs, exploring the attraction effect and compromise effect. By examining tendencies for bargainers to favor intermediate options, the researchers present compelling experimental findings that shed light on decision-making nuances in bargaining contexts. Through rigorous experimentation and data analysis, TexGen continues to contribute valuable insights to the field of decision research and experimental economics.